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DEREK J. SOMOGY*
ABSTRACT
The private sector has collected volumes of data on nearly all of
us. Blending public and private data and analyzing it using clever
algorithms has the potential to yield useful results, but is society
willing to forego certain assumptions about what is private
information in order to receive the benefits of the data? Is the
public truly willing to miss out on those potential benefits for the
sake of protecting what might already be public anyway? This
article examines some of the most relevant events of 2005
concerning privacy and the commercial information industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information brokers came under great public scrutiny in 2005. The
widely reported security breaches at ChoicePoint and LexisNexis,
which focused attention on information-handling practices, heightened
public concern over the security of personal information and have
begun to shape the future of the data brokering market. At the same
time, the information industry has continued to provide its services and
assert the legality of its business methods. Indeed, federal and state
legislative efforts emerged that attempted to address the concerns
raised by privacy intrusions while recognizing the social benefits
generated by the commercial information industry. This article
presents significant events relating to the field of commercial
information sellers and privacy that occurred in 2005, set against the
contextual backdrop of the industry's evolving history. The topic is
introduced by recounting the problems at ChoicePoint and LexisNexis.
This article will sketch a brief evolution of the data industry, followed
by critiques of the current regulatory frameworks and the industry's
responses. The article concludes with a look at proposed federal
legislation on the issue.
II. 2005 DATA BROKER PRIVACY CRISES - SECURITY BREACHES CALL
ATTENTION TO THE INFORMATION BROKER INDUSTRY
In 2005, several high-profile security breaches magnified the
attention that had already begun to focus on the personal data industry.
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When personal identifying information was stolen from ChoicePoint
and LexisNexis by hackers, the privacy implications were immediately
apparent: information about consumers was not adequately guarded
and may have fallen into the hands of unauthorized users. After
further consideration, it became apparent that, the privacy
considerations surrounding this industry extended beyond problems of
theft and unauthorized use. Identity theft may be mundane compared
to the enormous scope of individual information being amassed,
analyzed, and sold by commercial data brokers.
A. CHOICEPOINT
The 2005 10-K Annual Report filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission lists ChoicePoint's business as a "provider of
enhanced information services" to four major markets: Insurance
Services, Business Services, Government Services, and Marketing
Services.' Early in February 2005, ChoicePoint began notifying over
30,000 California residents that their personal information held by
ChoicePoint was accessed by unauthorized users. The consumer data
was accessed by hackers posing as ChoicePoint customers to further
identity theft crimes. ChoicePoint's initial response was limited to
notifying the affected consumers only in California because of that
state's notification requirement obligating firms to notify consumers
when security breaches occur.2 By the end of February, ChoicePoint
acknowledged that some 145,000 "consumers in all 50 states, the
District of Columbia and three territories might have been affected by
a breach of the company's credentialing process."3  California
authorities estimated that closer to 500,000 consumers were affected
by this breach.4 Olatunji Oluwatosin of Los Angeles is currently in a
California prison for his role in the crime, which remains under
investigation.5 In the wake of this incident, ChoicePoint has publicly
1 ChoicePoint Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 4 (Mar. 16, 2005).
2 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29 and 1798.82 - 1798.84 (West 2005) (California's Notice of
Security Breach Statutes); California maintains a website that is committed exclusively to the
state's privacy concerns, http://www.privacy.ca.gov.
3ChoicePoint Vows to Tighten Controls, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 22, 2005, at C3.
4 U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein, Protecting Privacy Has Become a Federal Concern, (Mar. 5,
2005), http://feinstein.senate.gov/news-idtheft03O5.html.
5David Coker, Identity Data ThiefFaces New Charges, LA TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005 at C2.
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promised changes, especially with regard to notifying victims.
According to Carol A. DiBattiste, the company's Chief Credentialing,
Compliance and Privacy Officer, ChoicePoint has "made fundamental
changes in our products, processes and policies, including the adoption
of one of the strictest consumer notification policies in the 
industry. '6
B. LEXISNEXIS
In March, LexisNexis announced that personal data at one of its
subsidiary companies, Seisint, had been accessed by unauthorized
persons. According to the LexisNexis press release announcing its
acquisition of Seisint,
Seisint provides information products that allow business,
financial services, legal and government customers to
quickly and easily extract valuable knowledge from a vast
array of data. Its products, including Accurin and
Securint M, support customers in critical activities such as
debt recovery, due diligence, fraud detection, identity
verification, law enforcement, legal investigations, pre-
employment screening, resident screening, and data
supercomputing. Seisint's services and products are
supported by integrating the Seisint Data Supercomputer
technology and patent-pending data linking methods.7
In industry parlance, Seisint's business is "data mining." According to
its initial estimates, the unauthorized users may have gained access to
some 310,000 individuals' sensitive data, including social security
numbers or driver's license numbers.8 LexisNexis identified fifty-nine
6 Press Release, ChoicePoint, ChoicePoint Notifies Consumers (Sept, 22, 2005),
http://www.privacyatchoicepoint.com/news/statement_091605.html.
7 Press Release, LexisNexis, LexisNexis Completes Acquisition of Seisint, Inc. (Sept. 1,
2004), http://www.lexisnexis.com/about/releases/0730.asp.
8 Press Release, LexisNexis, LexisNexis Concludes Review of Data Search Activity,
Identifying Additional Instances of Illegal Data Access (Apr. 12, 2005),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/about/releases/0789.asp [hereinafter LexisNexis Concludes
Review].
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instances of misuse, coming primarily from unauthorized persons
using IDs and passwords of legitimate Seisint customers.
9
Ill. THE DATA INDUSTRY
The information industry generates noteworthy revenues. In 2004,
LexisNexis brought in over $2.2 billion and ChoicePoint over $900
million.10 Some estimates put the total worldwide revenue created by
the information industry in 2004 at over $250 billion." The high
monetary value of this business underscores both the high demand for
and the prevalent use of information products. The larger scope of the
information "universe" goes beyond the concerns of this article, so the
present discussion is limited to the markets typified by LexisNexis and
ChoicePoint, which includes personal identifying data gleaned from
public records as well as data consensually disclosed by individuals to
proprietary entities.1 2  The way in which the information may be
bought, sold, and arranged into a commercial product is what makes
the industry's practices implicate privacy concerns.
Generally, the development of the information industry has
paralleled the development of the computer industry. During the
1970s, businesses began to digitize marketable information and store it
in searchable databases. As computing speeds and storage capacities
increased, the scope and amount of information digitized and sold also
increased. Continued improvement in computer technologies have
resulted in the size of today's databases being on the order of petabytes
(or 1015 bytes).
In Robert O'Harrow, Jr.'s 2005 book, No Place to Hide, he argues
"[w]here the data revolution meets the needs of national security, there
91d.
10 Press Release, Reed Elsevier, Reed Elsevier Announces 2004 Full Year Results (Apr.
2005), http://www.reed-elsevier.com/index.cfin?articleid=1278; Press Release, ChoicePoint,
ChoicePoint Reports Record Annual Revenue and Earnings per Share (Jan. 26, 2005),
http://www.choicepointinc.com/choicepoint/news.nsf/1 e81 a178107b63b 18525687fD05493a7/
e86563 1 fe8b8db3385256f94007b77cb?OpenDocument (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
11 Press Release, Outsell, Inc., SIIA and Outsell, Inc. Work Together to Raise the Profile of the
Information Industry, (Apr. 13, 2005) http://www.outsellinc.com/where/press-releases/
siia and outsell work together (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
12 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS
(Dec. 1997), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/privacy/wkshp97/irsdocl.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
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is... No Place to Hide."'13 O'Harrow details how the private sector
has amassed voluminous digital records of individuals' interactions
with the world. O'Harrow describes information products, mostly
connected to the concept of identity, that use esoteric technologies to
go far beyond the industry's stock in trade credit reports. Referring to
the information they provide to the government, he regards
ChoicePoint as "the world's largest private intelligence operation."'
14
Because the nature of the business evolved away from the intended
scope of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), O'Harrow sees
these businesses as operating in a markedly unregulated environment.
During the late 90s, the industry responded to hints of forthcoming
regulation by adopting a self-regulatory scheme.15 Under the umbrella
"Individual Reference Services Group" ("IRSG"), company
representatives argued to the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") that
industry-established norms would be sufficient to satisfy privacy
concerns. 16 O'Harrow views the IRSG as "a strong lobby opposed to
heavy data regulation.' 17 Coupled with the popular media coverage of
the aforementioned breaches at LexisNexis and ChoicePoint, No Place
to Hide cast the information industry in a questionable light and no
doubt contributed to the public interest in the issue.
On the other side of the argument, Derek Smith's Risk Revolution
largely defends the information industry's recent product offerings.'
8
Smith bases his analysis of the information industry's practices in a
modem context largely characterized by asymmetric threats.
19
According to Smith, the responsible use of information may mitigate
risks and that is a good thing. To support this, Smith points out how
technologies like link analytics20 can be used to uncover the
13 ROBERT O'HARRow, JR., No PLACE TO HIDE (2005), cover.
d t 156.
I51d. at 150.
16 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 12.
17 O'HARROW, supra note 13 at 150.
18 DEREK V. SMITH, RISK REVOLUTION: THE THREATS FACING AMERICA & TECHNOLOGY'S
PROMISE FOR A SAFER TOMoRROw (2004). Mr. Smith is the CEO of ChoicePoint.
9 Id. at 52-56.
20 Smith explains link analytics as "software that is designed to examine public records and
other database information to detect connections and non-obvious relationships that may exist
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confederates of known criminals or terrorists. Indeed, the degree of
connectedness between the September 11 th hijackers is alarming and
the potential ability to uncover the entire lot of them based on any one
individual's connection to other known terrorists is appealing.
Further, Smith argues that anchoring identity to DNA information, and
having that information available in electronic databases may serve
various criminal law interests, including exonerating the wrongly
convicted and averting serial recidivism. 22" Smith, however, makes the
practical realization that information must be handled responsibly
because "[w]e want a balance between privacy and risk reduction." 23
The year 2005 seemed primed for a conflict between privacy and
reasonable uses of information. The data industry was collecting vast
amounts of data on our day-to-day lives and processing it for sale in
largely unknown and unregulated ways. Alternatively, the information
industry has developed analytical tools that yield highly desirable
results.
IV. PRIVACY CRITIQUES
Even before the security breaches of 2005 attracted nationwide
attention to the commercial data industry, privacy groups were chafing
at the industry's practices and pressed the federal and state
governments to pay more attention to the industry's attendant privacy
issues. The most notable of these groups include the Electronic
Privacy Information Center ("EPIC") and the Center for Democracy
and Technology ("CDT"). According to its Web site, "EPIC is a
public interest research center [that focuses] public attention on
emerging civil liberties issues and A 4 rotects] privacy, the First
Amendment, and constitutional values." Similarly, CDT "works to
among individuals and/or organizations engaged in conspiracy or criminal activity. Typically,
this information is scattered among the billions of documents and records (e.g., a change of
address) generated in the course of daily life. Sometimes these connections are intentionally
hidden links. Analytics is not, as often portrayed in the media, all-powerful, invasive spyware
used to probe the details of the everyday lives of ordinary people." Id. at 66.
21 1d. at 71-73.
22Id. at 123-25.
23 Id. at 180 (emphasis in original).
24 About EPIC, http://www.epic.org/epic/about.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2006).
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promote democratic values and constitutional liberties in the digital
age.
'25
In late 2004, EPIC filed a letter with the Federal Trade
Commission urging the agency to investigate ChoicePoint, and other
commercial data brokers, to determine their compliance with the
FCRA, and the adequacy of current legislation in dealing with privacy
issues surrounding the private industry collection of records.26 In
moving from products covered under the FCRA to products not
covered under the FCRA, EPIC argued that ChoicePoint and other
data brokers are skirting the mandates of the law.27 Specifically, any
unregulated data products present a risk of returning to the pre-FCRA
era of reports plagued with "inaccurate, falsified, and irrelevant
information., 28 EPIC further argued that federal case law supports the
rule that data products derived from FCRA protected sources are also
protected by the FCRA.29 Alternatively, if these products are truly
outside the reach of FCRA regulation, EPIC urged the FTC to identify
the problems in the industry and work with Congress to expand the
coverage of the Act.3
0
Following the disclosure by ChoicePoint about its security breach,
EPIC sent a letter to ChoicePoint's Chief Operating Officer requesting
that ChoicePoint tell consumers precisely what information was
accessed by the hackers and disgorge the money earned by the sale of
the data,31
By early March, the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs held a hearing on "Identity Theft: Recent
Developments Involving the Security of Sensitive Consumer
Information" that touched on the issues raised by the ChoicePoint and
25 About CDT, http://www.cdt.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2006).
26 Letter from EPIC to the Federal Trade Commission on ChoicePoint and FCRA Databases
(Dec. 16, 2004), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/feraltrl2.16.04.html.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 id.
31 Letter from EPIC to ChoicePoint on FCRA (Feb. 18, 2005), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cpltr2.18.05 
.html.
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LexisNexis crises. 32  Indeed, Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL)
announced that one purpose of the hearing was "to gain insight into the
state of industry compliance with the laws designed to protect personal
financial information and to learn whether the current legal framework
provides adequate protections and has kept pace with changes in the
marketplace. ' 3 In addition, Senator Jon S. Corzine (D-NJ)
contemplated legislation that would cede to the FTC the ability to
regulate "non-financial third party data collectors." 34  In his brief
testimony, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) urged that "[c]onsumers
should know who has their data, what it is being used for and how they
can correct mistakes. They should also have notice, consistent with
law enforcement considerations, so that they can protect
themselves. 35 This hearing was indicative of the attention that was
beginning to focus on the information industry and its practices.
Five days later, EPIC President Marc Rotenberg testified before
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and
Commerce's Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer
Protection.36 Rotenberg testified that ChoicePoint's business practices
impose great costs on victims of identity theft, circumvent the FCRA,
and that the FTC was failing to "aggressively pursue privacy
32 U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Hearing Detail
http://banking.senate.gov/index.cfhi?Fuseaction=Hearings.Detail&HearingID= 142 (last
visited Jan. 4, 2006). (This website of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs provides the details of the hearing and the testimony given at those hearings).
33 Identity Theft: Recent Developments Involving the Security of Sensitive Consumer
Information: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong.
(2005) (statement of Sen. Richard Shelby, Member, Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs).
34 Identity Theft: Recent Developments Involving the Security of Sensitive Consumer
Information: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong.
(2005) (statement of Sen. Jon S. Corzine, Member, Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs).
3 5 Identity Theft: Recent Developments Involving the Security of Sensitive Consumer
Information: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong.
(2005) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
36 Consumer Privacy and ChoicePoint Data Theft: Hearing before the H Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th
Congress (2005) (statement of Marc Rotenberg, President, EPIC), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/03152005hearingl455/Rotenberg.pdf.
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protection." 37 In identifying potential legislative options to deal with
the issue, Rotenberg advocated a system that closely adheres to
already understood Fair Information Practices and referred to a
potential framework of regulation.
3 8
"A Model Regime of Privacy Protection v. 2.0" is a proposed
legislative framework written by Daniel Solove, Associate Professor
of Law at George Washington University Law School and Chris
Hoofnagle, Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center, West
Coast Office. 39  After identifying the limits of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act and the Privacy Act of 1974 in regulating the
commercial data broker industry, the authors articulate sixteen
desirable legislative "mandates," including:
1. Universal Notice: "[t]o ensure meaningful access, opt-out,
and other rights, there must be a way to provide people with
notice about all of the companies collecting their
information."4° This flows from the fact that the public is
largely unaware of the companies who collect personal
identifying data, and any control the public might exercise of
that data.41
2. Meaningful Informed Consent: "[t]here must be a way to
ensure that consumers can exercise meaningful informed
consent about the uses and dissemination of their personal
information."4 2 Current industry practices give consumers
inconsistent control over the data they disclose. This
371d. at7.
381d. at 10.
39 Daniel J. Solove & Chris J. Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection (Version
2.0), GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 132 (Apr. 5, 2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=699701.
'°Id. at 10.
41 id.
4 2 d. at 11.
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mandate would grant more control to consumers to decide
when and how to share information.43
3. One-Step Exercise of Rights: "[t]o ensure the meaningful
exercise of rights with regard to personal information, there
must be a way to exercise these rights in an efficient and
easy manner that is centralized."" Exercising control over
how one's data is shared would be difficult if the consumer
had to notify each and every company that deals with the
information. For this reason, it makes more sense to have
easy to handle and centralized administrative controls.45
4. Individual Credit Management: "[t]o ensure effective
individual management of consumer reporting, there must be
a way for individuals to have knowledge when entities
attempt to access their credit records and have the ability to
block such access. A6 This measure would frustrate attempts
by identity thieves to obtain credit in their victim's name.47
5. Access to and Accuracy of Personal Information: "[t]here
must be a way for individuals to ensure that their personal
information maintained by various data brokers is
maintained accurately and that it is not kept for an
unreasonable amount of time."48 Consumers whose data is
being sold by information businesses should have access to
their personal identifying data so it can be monitored for
inaccuracies; this information should persist only for limited
times.49
43 Id.
44Id. at 11-12.
45 Solove & Hoofiiagle, supra note 39 at 11-12.
4Id. at 12-13.
47 Id.
41Id. at 13.
49 Id.
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6. Secure Identification: "[t]here must be a way to prevent
readily available pieces of personal information from being
used as passwords to gain access to people's records and
accounts. 5° Institutions who grant access to information
based on readily ascertained data (like birthdates or social
security numbers) unnecessarily put consumers at risk of
identity theft.
51
7. Disclosure of Security Breaches: "[t]here must be a way
for individuals to learn about security breaches that result in
the leakage or improper access of their personal data."
52
Consumers are unable to take protective steps when their
data is compromised if the businesses responsible for the
data fail to notify those affected.53
8. Social Security Number Use Limitation: "[tihere must be
a way to reduce the use of social security numbers by private
sector businesses. 54  This measure would push back the
current trend of using the social security number as a general
purpose identifier.55
9. Access and Use Restrictions for Public Records: "[t]here
must be a way to regulate access and uses of public records
that maximizes exposure of government activities and
minimizes the disclosure of personal information about
individuals. 56  Transparency in government is not
particularly served by the wholesale disclosure of personal
data, so restrictions should be imposed to frustrate efforts to
50 Id. at 14.
51 Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 39 at 14.
52 Id. at 14-15.
53 Id.
54Id. at 15.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 16.
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farm commercially valuable data from public records while
maintaining the public oversight purpose of the records."
10. Curbing Excessive Uses of Background Checks: "[t]here
must be a way to limit the use of background checks to those
jobs where there is a reasonable and justifiable need.,18
Background checks now cost so little that they are
undertaken in situations that do not necessarily warrant a
detailed look into another's life.59
11. Private Investigators: "[t]here must be a system that
ensures greater accountability in the private investigator
profession., 60  Private investigators are not regulated like
public law enforcement officials, thus they pose a risk for
abusing information tools.
61
12. Limiting Government Access to Business and Financial
Records: "[t]here must be a way to engage in electronic
commerce and routine transactions without losing one's
expectation of privacy in personal data., 62 The government
is keen to avoid problems that inhere in actually collecting
data, so they often purchase it from private sector businesses.
However, consumers should not be forced to forfeit an
expectation of privacy in the data simply because the
government gathers the data from a third-party business.63
13. Government Data Mining: "[t]here must be a way to
ensure that government data mining does not permit law
57 Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 39 at 16.
" Id. at 16-17.
59 Id.
60Id. at 17.
6t id.
621Id. at 18.
63 Solove & Hoofinagle, supra note 39 at 18.
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enforcement to engage in dragnet searches for prospective
crimes. Where data mining is employed, it should occur in
as open a way as possible with adequate judicial oversight
and public accountability." 64  Indiscriminate use of link
analytic technologies to uncover webs of association runs
contrary to our society's long established legal and
normative distaste for dragnet searches.65
14. Control of Government Maintenance of Personal
Information: "[t]here must be meaningful regulation
limiting the collection of personal data, acceptable uses,
accuracy, security, and retention of personal information by
government agencies, especially since they are acquiring
more and more data about individuals. 66 This point brings
attention to the fact that the Privacy Act of 1974 might not
be adequate to protect privacy in 2005.67
15. Preserving the Innovative Role of the States: "[t]he ability
of states to innovate new approaches to privacy protections
must be preserved., 68 Above and beyond federal legislation,
this requirement contemplates the possibility that states will
enact even more protective privacy laws.69
16. Effective Enforcement of Privacy Rights: "[t]here must be
a way to ensure that privacy protections are enforced with
meaningful sanctions as well as provide meaningful redress
to victims. 70  As long as plaintiffs are required to prove
actual damages for privacy violations, the judicial
Id. at 18-19.
65 Id.
66 1d. at 19-20.
67 id.
6 1 Id. at 20-21.
69 Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 39 at 20-21.
70 Id. at21.
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enforcement of federal privacy policies will be shortchanged.
This provision would make it easier for victims to recover,
as well as encourage prudent industry practices.7'
The "Model Regime" is a work in progress. Its second version (v.
2.0) embraced many of the suggestions offered after the release of v.
1.1. 72  At the end of March, Chris Hoofnagle testified before the
California Senate Banking, Finance, and Insurance Committee on data
security.73 In his testimony, Hoofnagle listed the alarming quantity of
smaller data companies ChoicePoint has acquired since 1997.74 By
arguing that "the public does not fully understand how this information
is gathered, used, and sold," he argued that ChoicePoint has given
privacy considerations short shrift.75  Hoofnagle concluded by
advocating that the state legislature embrace several positions from his
"Model Regime" paper, discussed supra.
76
Although ChoicePoint announced in early March that it was
exiting the "non-FCRA consumer-sensitive data markets," 77 Solove
and Hoofnagle promptly rejected this announcement as insufficient to
cure the problems for eight reasons. First, ChoicePoint's reforms only
limit the market behavior of ChoicePoint and therefore do not
represent a total solution to the problem.78  Second, the use of
71 Id.
72 See id. at 22-36 (commentary on the Model Regime).
73 After the Breach: How Secure and Accurate is Consumer Information Held by ChoicePoint
and Other Data Aggregators?: Hearing Before the Senate Banking, Finance and Insurance
Committee, 2005 Leg. Sess. (Ca. 2005) (statement of Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Director,
Electronic Privacy Information Center West Coast Office), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/casban3.30.05.html.
74id
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 ChoicePoint to Exit Non-FCRA, Consumer-Sensitive Data Markets (Mar. 4, 2005),
http://www.privacyatchoicepoint.con/news/statement_030405.html [hereinafter ChoicePoint
to Exit].
78 Daniel Solove & Chris Hoofnagle, ChoicePoint's Response to the Sale of Information to
Criminals is Inadequate, EPIC ChoicePoint,
http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/#inadequate (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
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truncated social security numbers is only a minor hurdle to anyone
actually intent on getting the full number because it could be found
from other sources.7 9  Third. studies show that as many as 90% of
these records contain errors. 0 Fourth, consumers have no way to
correct public information in the ChoicePoint reports.8 1  Fifth,
ChoicePoint has little reason to cater to the interests of individuals
whose records it sells.8 2 Sixth, ChoicePoint is only retreating from a
portion of the market and will continue to sell sensitive personal
information in other contexts, includinf consumer-driven transactions
and to accredited corporate customers. Seventh, the exception to this
policy for antifraud purposes is too broad. 4 And finally, ChoicePoint
will continue to sell the personal information to government law
enforcement agencies.
8 5
In June, the Center for Democracy and Technology urged
Congress to "amend the Privacy Act [of 1974] to make it clear that it
applies to government use of commercial data."86 CDT argued that the
requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974 would be triggered by
combined government/private sector databases.8 7
In July, Chris Hoofnagle testified before the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce's Subcommittee
on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection to give commentary
on the "Discussion Draft of Data Protection Legislation.,88 Hoofnagle
79 Id.
80 d.
81 Id.
82 id.
83 Id.
84 Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 78.
85 id.
86 Memorandum from CDT to Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Comm., DHS on
Recommended Policies for Use of Private Sector Data, (Jul. 18, 2005), available at
http://www.cdt.org/testimony/20050718schwartz.pdf.
87 Id.
8 Data Security: The Discussion Draft of Data Protection Legislation: Hearing before the H
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection, Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
109th Congress (2005) (statement of Chris Jay Hooffiagle, Director and Senior Counsel, EPIC
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went beyond the problems at ChoicePoint, and stressed the widespread
problem of personal data mismanagement.8 9 Citing statistics compiled
by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Hoofnagle recounted that
group's accounting of the "Chronology of Data Breaches Reported
Since the ChoicePoint Incident." 90 According to their estimates, over
50 million identities have been compromised in the U.S. by a wide
array of private and public entities, which Hoffnagle used to support
the drastic need for Congress to legislate in the privacy/data arena.
9 1
As to the Discussion Draft's proposals, Hoofnagle offered the
following comments:
" The Discussion Draft should contain credit freeze
language, thereby allowing individuals to prevent
unauthorized credit requests made by identity
thieves.92
" Any legislation must go beyond simply making
personal data more secure, and pay attention to
privacy interests apart from database security.93
Although bolstered security measures may prevent
hackers from gaining access to personal information,
it is the industry practices that allow collection and
preservation of certain data that may violate privacy
norms.
* Companies should employ audit trails to deter and
detect misuse of information. 4
West Coast Office), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/datasec7.28.05.html
[hereinafter Discussion Draft of Data Protection Legislation].
89 Id.
90 A Chronology of Data Breaches Reported Since the ChoicePoint Incident,
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
91 Id
92 Discussion Draft of Data Protection Legislation, supra note 88.
93 Id.
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" Data brokers should be audited by the Federal Trade
Commission, and individuals should be able to
check their dossiers at no charge.
95
* The standard for triggering a business' duty to notify
consumers of an intrusion should be whether there is
a "reasonable risk or reasonable basis to believe that
such access could lead to misuse of personal
information." 96 Also, the scope of the legislation
should encompass companies that "owns or
possesses data," as opposed to California's "any
company that owns or licenses data."
97
* Enforcement of the law by the Federal Trade
Commission is appropriate under its authority to
address unfair and deceptive trade practices. 98
However, enforcement powers should also extend to
state Attorneys General.99
* The best definition of a data broker is "a business
entity which for monetary fees, dues, or on a
cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages, in
whole or in part, in the practice of collecting,
transmitting, or otherwise providing personally
identifiable information on a nationwide basis on
more than 5,000 individuals who are not the
customers or employees of the business entity or
affiliate. ' '°
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 id.
98 Discussion Draft of Data Protection Legislation, supra note 88.
" Id.
1O0Id.
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* Blanket federal preemption is not desirable-leave
the states some ability to regulate privacy matters.'0 '
* Privacy legislation should not automatically end via
a "sunset" provision, although the issue should be
revisited occasionally by the legislature.'02
* The Federal Trade Commission should receive the
funds necessary to enforce the law effectively.1
0 3
By and large, Hoofnagle supported the Discussion Draft.
In early November, a large coalition of privacy and consumer
advocates conveyed their concerns over legislative attempts to
improve privacy laws in a letter to Senators Arlen Specter (R-PA) and
Patrick Leahy (D-VT).'04 Signing the letter were representatives from:
the Center for Digital Democracy, Electronic Privacy Information
Center, Identity Theft Resource Center, National Consumers League,
Privacy Journal, Privacy Times, World Privacy Forum, Consumer
Action, Liberty Coalition, PrivacyActivism, Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group. Worried that
proposed legislation focused on data security to the detriment of
greater policy considerations of privacy and fairness, the letter urged
that legislation include the following:
* Notice of security breaches in all instances. i°5
" "A broad definition of identity theft," to cover both
actual and attempted fraud.' °6
101 Id.
103 id.
104 Coalition Letter on Data Security Bills to Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Nov. 9,
2005), http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/datamarkerl 1.09.05.html.
105 Id.
106 id.
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" A consumer-friendly freeze on access to credit. 10 7
* "Limits on collection, use, and disclosure of social
security numbers."'0 8
" Preservation of state laws and law-making ability.' 09
" "Special measures to address commercial data
brokers.",110
The privacy critiques of the information industry not only
addressed the particular information products offered, but also the
regulatory framework that allowed such products to be developed in
the first place. Indeed, privacy interest groups have offered
suggestions on how personal identifying information could be better
handled. The effect of public, interest group, and congressional
pressures on the information industry remains to be seen.
V. INDUSTRY RESPONSES
After being caught with significant data breaches in early 2005,
data brokers like ChoicePoint and LexisNexis had to defend publicly
their own practices and the industry generally. In some cases, the
companies promised to alter how they conduct their business.
In March, ChoicePoint elected to discontinue selling identity
products to a sector of its market that seemed to pose a great risk for
identity theft.' 1 In a press release, ChoicePoint CEO Derek Smith
cited the recent fraud activity and consumer response as motivating the
business decision which was estimated to lower 2005 revenues by$15-20 million. l ' To be sure, ChoicePoint was not getting out of the
107 id.
108 Id.
"10 Coalition Letter on Data Security Bills to Senate Committee on the Judiciary, supra note
104.
... ChoicePoint to Exit, supra note 77.
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sensitive personal information market entirely but rather limited its
future sales to three potential scenarios:
113
1. "Support consumer-driven transactions where the data is
needed to complete or maintain relationships such as
insurance, employment and tenant screening or to provide
access to their own data;"'"14
2. "Provide authentication or fraud prevention tools to large,
accredited corporate customers where consumers have
existing relationships. For example, information tools for
identity verification, customer enrollment and insurance
claims; ' 15 or
3. "Assist federal, state and local government and criminal
justice agencies in their important missions."' 1 6
4. In addition to immediately abandoning this market,
ChoicePoint provided approximately $2 million in services
to those consumers whose identities had been
compromised.1 7  Also, the company created "an
independent office of Credentialing, Compliance and
Privacy that will report to the Board of Directors' Privacy
Committee.""'8
Like Hoofnagle, ChoicePoint also testified in front of the
California Senate Banking, Finance, and Insurance Committee. 19
113id.
l1"Id
115 Id.
116 id,
117 ChoicePoint, supra note 77.
118SId.
'
19 Hearing before the Senate Banking, Finance and Insurance Committee, 2005 Leg. Sess.
(Ca, 2005) (statement of Don McGuffey, Vice President, Data Acquisition and Strategy,
ChoicePoint Services Inc.), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/cp3.30.05.pdf
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After apologizing for the recent upsets caused by the company,
ChoicePoint's Vice-President for Data Acquisition and Strategy, Don
McGuffey, presented the Committee with a list of the beneficial
services provided by ChoicePoint, including:
" "Identification and credential verification services to
businesses, government, and non-profit
organizations."
* Identification of 11,000 undisclosed felons who
were attempting to volunteer with youth
organizations.1
21
* Law enforcement collaboration, including the
identification of the D.C.-area snipers and providing
services to the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children. 
122
* Helping American individuals and businesses obtain
insurance products. 1
23
* Facilitating employment through pre-employment
background checks. 1
24
As to regulation of the industry, McGuffey noted how the Fair
Credit Reporting Act and the recently enacted Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and the Drivers
Privacy Protection Act all place limits on how ChoicePoint handles
data. 125 Furthermore, he stated that ChoicePoint was committed to
developing rigorous information security policies. To support this, he
120 Id. at2.
121 id.
122 id.
123 id.
124 Id.
125 Hearings before the Senate Banking Committee, supra note 119 at 3.
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pointed to the recently created independent office of Credentialing,
Compliance, and Privacy that reports to the Board of Directors'
Privacy Committee, to be headed by a former senior prosecutor at the
Justice Department with extensive experience in the detection and
prosecution of financial fraud.' 26  As was disclosed in March,
McGuffey noted how ChoicePoint was abandoning a portion of the
sensitive personal data market. He further apologized for the security
breaches and pledged to support their victims.2 "
By the time LexisNexis announced its breach at Seisint in April, it
had already notified the 30,000 individuals whose identities may have
been accessed by unauthorized persons. 128 LexisNexis seems to have
opted for a frank admission of the breach, which it discovered during
its own internal investigation. To the victims of the breach,
LexisNexis offered free support services, including credit reports,
credit monitoring for one year, fraud insurance, and fraud counseling
services. 129 According to its April press release, no individual who
accepted the offer of free credit reports and monitoring had advised the
company of "having experienced any form of identity theft."'
130
In addition to responding to the data breach crisis and testifying in
front of legislators, ChoicePoint uses a website devoted to addressing
privacy concerns, http://www.privacyatchoicepoint.com. In defense of
its position and reputation, ChoicePoint has made the following
postings:13
* March 4, 2005: ChoicePoint decided to exit the
non-FCRA, consumer sensitive markets. 13
2
126 Id. at 4-5.
127 Id. at 5-6.
128 LexisNexis Concludes Review, supra note 8.
129 id.
130 id.
31 Privacy at ChoicePoint: Company Statements,
http://www.privacyatchoicepoint.com/news/statements.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2005).
132 ChoicePoint to Exit, supra note 77.
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0 May 4, 2005: In response to an article in The Wall
Street Journal claiming that the data breach covered
"millions of people," ChoicePoint reasserted its
estimate that "145,000 consumers may have had
their personal information improperly accessed."
Further, it stressed a commitment to fighting fraud
and improving the quality of its business
practices.
133
* July 12, 2005: ChoicePoint posted the transcript of
Carol DiBattiste's presentation to the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners. DiBattiste,
ChoicePoint's Chief Credentialing, Compliance, and
Privacy officer is a former Deputy Administrator of
the U.S. Transportation Security Administration.'
34
" August 23, 2005: Contrary to claims in the press,
ChoicePoint offered consumers the ability to see
their own public records information at no cost.
35
* November 9, 2005: To clarify an Associated Press
story, ChoicePoint asserted that notifications
disclosed in an SEC 10-Q filing do not represent
previously undisclosed notices. 1
36
VI. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Members of Congress were concerned that current laws had not
adequately regulated the commercial data broker industry, and several
133 Press Release, ChoicePoint, ChoicePoint Responds to 5/3 Article in The Wall Street
Journal, (May 4, 2005), http://www.privacyatchoicepoint.com/news/statement_050405.html.
134 Press Release, ChoicePoint, Presentation to Association of Certified Fraud Examiners,
(July 12, 2005), http://www.privacyatchoicepoint.com/news/statement_071205.htmi.
135 Press Release, ChoicePoint, ChoicePoint Does Not Charge Consumers for Existing
Information About Themselves, (Aug. 23, 2005),
http://www.privacyatchoicepoint.com/news/statement_082305.html.
136 Press Release, ChoicePoint, ChoicePoint Clarifies AP Story, (Nov. 9, 2005),
http://www.privacyatchoicepoint.com/news/statement_1 10905.html.
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bills appeared in the U.S. House and Senate during 2005. These
included:
House Bill 3140, or the "Consumer Data Security and Notification
Act of 2005. " 137 This would amend the FCRA to bring data brokers
within the Act's coverage. Also, the FTC would promulgate
safeguards to protect non-public consumer information. The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act would be amended to require security breach
notifications. This bill was referred to the House Committee on
Financial Services on June 30, 2005.
Senate Bill 500, or the "Information Protection and Security
Act."' 138 (Related to House Bill 1080). This would direct the FTC to
promulgate regulations governing data brokers very close to the
traditional Fair Information Practices. Violations would be treated as
unfair or deceptive acts or practices under the Federal Trade
Commission Act. States may bring civil actions. This bill was
referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
on March 3, 2005.
Senate Bill 1789, "Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of
2005.,', 39  This would criminalize many of the acts that facilitate
identity theft. Data brokers would be required to disclose personal
records and have a mechanism in place for correcting inaccuracies.
Further, the Act mandates that the Comptroller General investigate
government use of commercial data products. This bill was placed on
the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders, Calendar No.
297 on November 17, 2005.
VII. CONCLUSION
In 2005, there was a substantial shake-up of the information
industry. Popular media coverage of the breaches at LexisNexis and
ChoicePoint, books like No Place to Hide, and the actions of privacy
interest groups all brought attention to the information industry's
practices. The information industry responded by pointing out the
137 Consumer Data Security and Notification Act of 2005, H.R. 3140, 109th Cong. (2005),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl09:H.R.3140:@@@D&summ2=m&.
138 Information Protection and Security Act, S. 500, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:S.500:@@@D&summ2=m&.
139 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1789, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d 109:S. 1789:@@@D&summ2=m&.
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benefits of its technologically impressive products and attempting to
avoid heavy regulation. Congress is interested in the issue and it
seems possible that it will update privacy laws to bring them into the
21 st century.

